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The Wagner Seed Saga: Is There Any Great 
Cercla Route That Potentially Responsible 
Parties Can Chart Between the Devil 
and the Deep Blue Sea? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 1 the D.C. Circuit sustained 
the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) denial of reim-
bursement to Wagner Seed Co. (Wagner) for its costs of clean-
ing up a chemical spill at Wagner's warehouse, even though 
Wagner proved a valid "act of God" defense. The court so held, 
even though 1) the EPA had ordered the cleanup under threat 
of severe sanctions and had successfully argued that Wagner 
would not suffer any "non-compensable harm" if it complied 
and were found not liable later, 2) the Second Circuit had de-
nied any pre-enforcement review of the EPA order on the basis 
that Wagner could have an adequate post hoc judicial review of 
its liability, and 3) the EPA later did not find Wagner liable for 
the spill which resulted from an "act of God," a lightning strike 
that caused the conflagration of the warehouse. 2 
The EPA argued both sides of the facts. First, the EPA 
claimed in the Second Circuit that Wagner was not entitled to 
an injunction since it would not suffer "non-compensable harm" 
if not liable by virtue of a valid defense. 3 That is, Wagner 
could petition for reimbursement from the EPA if no other 
Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) existed from whom to seek 
contribution. 4 
Second, the EPA, in the D.C. Circuit, claimed that Wagner 
was not entitled to reimbursement since it had completed most 
of its cleanup prior to enactment of the Superfund Amend-
1. 946 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Wagner III]. 
2. Id. 
3. Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 314 (2d Cir. 1986) [hereinafter 
Wagner I]. Between Wagner I and Wagner Ill, came Wagner Seed Co., Inc. v. 
Bush, 709 F. Supp. 249, 250 (D. D.C. 1989) [hereinafter Wagner II] wherein 
Wagner Seed unsuccessfully petitioned and then sued EPA for the costs of clean-
up resulting from Wagner's compliance with the order litigated in Wagner I. 
Wagner III is the appeal of Wagner II, thus completing a "Wagner Trilogy." 
4. Wagner, 800 F.2d at 314. 
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ments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)5 proVISIOns 
setting forth the reimbursement scheme. 6 The EPA interpreted 
the language of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) section 
106(b)(2)(A),7 to preclude reimbursement to Wagner. The court 
agreed. 
Wagner did not advance judicial estoppel or equitable es-
toppel to preclude the EPA from changing its previous asser-
tion that a remedy was available. Wagner failed to invoke 
CERCLA section 112,8 which provided a remedy prior to sec-
tion 106. Wagner brought its claim under section 106, rather 
than under section 112.9 Wagner could have asserted that if it 
was time-barred from the procedures of the new statutory en-
actment, then it was certainly entitled to relief under the pre-
existing procedures. Finally, the opinion never mentions es-
toppel issues which could have been raised by the court or by 
Wagner and should have been determinative. 10 
This paper discusses the effect of the courts' failure to 
consider judicial or equitable estoppel in holding the EPA to its 
original arguments in which it prevailed against Wagner. Sec-
tion II lays out the facts, procedure and reasoning beginning in 
Wagner 111 and concluding with Wagner 111. 12 Section III ex-
plores the provisions of CERCLA on which the courts relied in 
this ''Wagner Trilogy,"13 as well as the judicial estoppel doc-
trine on which no one relied. Section IV points out some pos-
sible flaws in the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in Wagner III, which 
should have changed the result. Section V provides suggested 
approaches that the courts, Potentially Responsible Parties 
(PRP) and the EPA should take to prevent such inequities in 
future actions, not just as pertaining to section 106 orders, but 
5. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 113 (1988) [hereinafter 
SARA]. 
6. Wagner Ill, 946 F.2d at 924. 
7. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act, § 106(b)(2)(A), Pub. L. 99-499, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(A) (1988) 
[hereinafter CERCLA]. 
8. ld. § 112(b), 42 u.s.c. § 9612(b). 
9. Wagner Ill at 920. 
10. ld.; see Mark J. Plumer, Note, Judicial Estoppel: The Refurbishing of a 
Judicial Shield, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 409 (1987); lB JEREMY C. MOORE, FEDER-
AL PRACTICE, 'JI 0.405 [8] (1991). 
11. 800 F.2d 310. 
12. 946 F.2d 918. 
13. See supra note 3. 
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as a general proposition. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
To appreciate fully the court's ruling in Wagner 11114 one 
must understand the long drama which occurred as Wagner 
sought equity amid a maze of regulatory and judicial limita-
tions. Wagner vainly attempted pre-enforcement judicial review 
of an EPA administrative order, was rebuffed in its constitu-
tional challenges as the courts found that due process after the 
fact would remedy all injustices, and then watched its promised 
remedy disappear as the most recent court apparently forgot or 
ignored the previous arguments and assurances of the EPA and 
the courts. 
A. Wagner I in the EPA 
Wagner Seed Company distributed animal feed and agri-
cultural chemicals to nurseries and municipalities from its 
inventory in a warehouse on Long Island. 15 On June 1, 1985, 
Wagner's warehouse burned to the ground in a fire caused by a 
lightning strike.16 Despite Wagner's efforts at control, under 
the guidance of hired experts, chemicals escaped to surround-
ing properties with the runoff produced as firefighters used 
water to fight the flamesY Wagner immediately commenced 
a cleanup, supervised by the New York State Department of 
Environmental Conservation (DEC).18 The EPA disputed the 
effectiveness of the cleanup, and when meetings between the 
EPA and Wagner proved unsatisfactory to the EPA, it issued 
an administrative order under CERCLA Section 106,19 re-
quiring prompt remedial actions, with eventual complete elimi-
nation of the contamination. 20 A $5000 daily fine for noncom-
pliance was threatened,21 with treble damages if government 
14. Wagner Ill, 946 F.2d at 920. 
15. Wagner I, 800 F.2d at 313. 
16. !d. 
17. ld. 
18. ld. 
19. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). 
20. CERCLA § l06(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) permits such orders upon a finding 
"that there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public 
health or welfare or the environment because of an actual or threatened release 
of a hazardous substance." !d. 
21. CERCLA § 106(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b). 
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resources had to be used to clean up the site.22 
B. Wagner I in the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of New York 
In the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of New York, Wagner moved for a preliminary injq.nction to 
stop the EPA from enforcing its section 106 administrative 
order or imposing sanctions.23 The EPA successfully argued 
that Wagner's remedy was to seek reimbursement after the 
cleanup, not judicial review prior to the cleanup. The EPA 
prevailed, arguing that Wagner would not suffer any "non-com-
pensable harm."24 The district court agreed that no unconsti-
tutional taking would occur, since due process would be satis-
fied.25 
C. Wagner I in the Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit determined that it and the district 
court lacked jurisdiction to conduct any pre-enforcement judi-
cial review as to Wagner's "act of God" defense.26 The court 
did consider the merits of Wagner's constitutional arguments 
that such a severe penalty without pre-enforcement review 
violated "due process." The court held the arguments unavail-
ing, saying that a good faith defense must be read into the 
statute.27 
The court sustained the statute by giving it a constitution-
al reading in an Ex Parte Young analysis.28 The statute would 
have been an unconstitutional burden, inhibiting a party from 
appealing any order absent some scheme to provide opportunity 
for testing the order without incurring debilitating or confisca-
tory penalties.29 Wagner would thus not be liable for punitive 
damages or fines if a reviewing court found it to "appear and in 
22. CERCLA § 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3). 
23. Wagner I, 800 F.2d at 312. 
24. ld. at 314. 
25. ld. at 312-313. 
26. ld. at 315. 
27. ld. at 316. 
28. ld. at 316 (interpreting Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (a penalty is 
unconstitutional if it is so severe that it intimidates a party from testing its 
validity in court); since a court must give a statute a constitutional reading if 
possible, a good faith defense must be read in to avoid unconstitutionality here). 
29. ld. at 314 (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Engman, 527 F.2d 
1115, 1119 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 426 U.S. 911 (1976)). 
401] WAGNER SEED 405 
good faith interpose defenses as a basis for noncompliance."30 
With unwarranted brevity, the court dispensed with the 
"unconstitutional taking" argument that later became the issue 
in Wagner II and Wagner III. 31 Wagner had expressed doubt 
that it could secure reimbursement from the EPA even if it suc-
cessfully proved that it was not a responsible party.32 The 
court referred back to the availability of the "good faith de-
fense" as protection against imposition of a fine or other penal-
ty.33 The court, siding with the EPA, stated that post-enforce-
ment judicial review would prevent any taking in violation of 
"due process."34 Until that time, Wagner could comply, and 
petition for reimbursement later. Alternatively, Wagner could 
refuse, relying on its "good faith defense" to strike down, in 
some future litigation, any accrued penalties.35 Wagner com-
plied in the face of the penalties. 
D. Wagner II in the EPA 
Upon ninety eight percent completion of the cleanup to the 
EPA's satisfaction, Wagner petitioned the EPA for reimburse-
ment of costs under the amended provisions of CERCLA section 
106(b)(2) which had been passed during the cleanup.36 The 
EPA denied the petition, interpreting the statute as precluding 
reimbursement of any cleanup activity begun prior to the pas-
sage of the act.37 While Wagner's "act of God" defense could 
relieve Wagner of any liability for the release or costs of clean-
up, the EPA said that reimbursement did not apply to a compa-
ny that had completed a substantial amount of cleanup before 
the 1986 enactment38 of the statute.39 
30. Id. at 316 (quoting Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 447 n.6 (1964)). 
31. Id. at 317. 
32. Id.; see also United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 606 F. Supp. 
412, 416; (D. Minn. 1985) Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736, 739 
(D. Kan. 1985); Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A., 599 F. Supp. 69, 73-74 (C.D. Cal. 1984) 
(indicating concern that reimbursement might not be available). 
33. Wagner I, 800 F.2d at 312, 317. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Wagner II, 709 F. Supp. at 250. 
37. Id. 
38. SARA § 613, 42 U.S.C. § 113 (1988). 
39. Wagner II, 709 F. Supp. at 252-53. 
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Following the EPA's denial of the petition for reim-
bursement, Wagner sued in the District of Columbia.40 That 
court held that the EPA made a reasonable interpretation of an 
ambiguous statuteY Deferring to the EPA, it held that the 
EPA had reasonably found the statute to be inapplicable to 
Wagner since Wagner had agreed to engage in cleanup prior to 
passage of the Act. 42 
The EPA changed its argument from Wagner I, where the 
court found Wagner's fear of "no reimbursement" unconvincing, 
despite Wagner's concern over the EPA reluctance to reimburse 
expenses as expressed in Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A. 43 
F. Wagner III in the District of Columbia Circuit 
In Wagner III, the D.C. Circuit sustained the district 
court's ruling in favor of the EPA's denial of reimbursement to 
Wagner, notwithstanding that the EPA did not dispute 
Wagner's "act of God" defense, thereby relieving Wagner of all 
liability. 
Judge Ginsburg held that the EPA was the administering 
agency of CERCLA, and that the court owed deference to the 
EPA's interpretation of the statute if it was a "permissible 
interpretation" of the language.44 The court then held that the 
EPA's interpretation of the reimbursement provision, that the 
SARA amendment did not apply to any party which received a 
cleanup order prior to enactment of SARA in 1986, was reason-
able.45 
In his dissent, Judge Williams argued that the EPA was 
not "the administrative agency" charged with administration of 
CERCLA, so deference was misplaced. Therefore, the interpre-
tation issue should not have been so summarily dismissed.46 
40. ld. 
41. ld. at 252-53. 
42. ld.; see also CERCLA § 106(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606(b)(2) (1988). 
43. 599 F. Supp. 69, 73-74 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (describing methods EPA may use 
to pursue an action); See Wagner I, 800 F.2d at 314; see also United States v. 
Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 606 F. Supp. 412, 416; (D. Minn. 1985); Wagner 
Elec. Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736, 739 (D. Kan. 1985). 
44. Wagner Ill, 946 F.2d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
45. ld. at 922-23 
46. ld. at 925-26 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
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Estoppel arguments were not discussed in the opinion. Wagner 
did not raise them, nor did the court do so "sua sponte."47 
Ill. BACKGROUND OF PERTINENT CERCLA PROVISIONS 
CERCLA was passed and funded in 1980.48 In 1986, Con-
gress passed SARA.49 Cleanups are funded by individual par-
ties responsible for the hazardous wastes disposed of, or by, the 
EPA from the Hazardous Substances Superfund50 or 
"Superfund."51 
Funding comes from general tax revenues, taxes on gener-
ators and manufacturers of hazardous chemicals, and from re-
covery actions against parties responsible for releases of haz-
ardous wastes. 52 The EPA can issue administrative orders 
under CERCLA to a Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) to 
conduct a cleanup.53 The EPA can assess penalties for non-
compliance or willful violations of the order. 54 
A. THE STATUTE: Key Provisions Regulating the EP4 and 
Potentially Responsible Parties under CERCLA Section 106 and 
Related Sections 
Section 106 has several provisions of interest. These provi-
sions include penalties, authority and administration, access to 
judicial review, and reimbursement schemes for parties ordered 
to clean up but later found not liable. 
1. Penalty Provisions 
The penalties for non-compliance with CERCLA are central 
to the instant case. The penalty provisions state that any per-
47. ld. at 919-920, 925. 
48. CERCLA § 101-175, 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (1988). 
49. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1614 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 
(1988)). The amendment included mandatory cleanup schedules and detailed 
cleanup standards, and provided additional funds and authority to regulate 
Superfund sites. ld. 
50. See CERCLA § 101(11), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(11) (1988); see also id. § 101, 42 
U.S.C. § 9601 (definitions under CERCLA). 
51. ld. § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. 
52. ld. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
53. ld. § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). 
54. ld. §§ 107(a) and(c). A detailed discussion of these provisions is provided 
by Richard H. Mays, but provisions key to Wagner III are summarized here. See gen-
erally Richard H. Mays, Who's Afraid Of CERCLA § 106 Administrative Orders?, 
19 ENV'T REP. CURR. DEV.(BNA) 1926 (1989). 
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son who, without sufficient cause, willfully violates, or fails or 
refuses to comply with a section 106 administrative order may 
be fined not more than $25,000 per day of violation. 55 Similar-
ly, 
if a person who is liable for a release or threat of a hazardous 
substance fails without sufficient cause to properly provide 
removal or remedial action pursuant to a section 106 adminis-
trative order, such person may be liable to the United States 
for punitive damages in an amount at least equal to, and not 
more than, three times the amount of any costs incurred by 
the fund as a result of such failure to take proper action. 56 
A Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) at a superfund site 
must therefore respond carefully to such an order.57 Conceiv-
ably, other future EPA policies may have similar review and 
sanction provisions and analogous EPA arguments before the 
courts. 
2. Authority and Administration 
CERCLA provides in relevant part: 
[W]hen the President determines that there may be an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment to the public health or 
welfare or the environment because of an actual or threatened 
release of a hazardous substance from a facility, he may re-
quire the Attorney General of the United States to secure 
such relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or 
threat . . . . The President may also . . . take other action 
under this section, including, but not limited to, issuing such 
orders as may be necessary to protect public health and wel-
fare and the environment.58 
The President's authority is actually redelegated to the EPA, 
the judiciary, and agencies such as the United States Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE) and the United States Department of 
Defense (DOD).59 
55. CERCLA § 106(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (1988). 
56. ld. § 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3). 
57. See, e.g., id. § 113(k)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(d)(2)(D) (parties which may 
be liable for costs of cleanup, by virtue of their responsibility for creating, dispos-
ing, etc. of the "released" hazardous material). 
58. ld. § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). 
59. Some authority under § 106 has been redelegated, to the Administrator of 
the EPA by Executive Order No. 12580, § 4(d)(1) (Jan. 25, 1987). Nevertheless, 
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3. Judicial Review 
Also central to Wagner I and Wagner III was the lack of pre-
enforcement review of a section 106 order in any U.S. district 
court, regardless of any justification for refusal to comply.60 
CERCLA precludes federal court jurisdiction to review any 
order issued under section 106, except for EPA-initiated en-
forcement actions such as a recovery action for response costs, 
damages, or contribution, an enforcement action, or an action 
to compel remedial activities.61 However, the EPA could take 
years to complete cleanup, and litigate liability before any judi-
cial review of the order occurs. The potential devastation of 
penalties compounding during all those years was no doubt a 
driving force in Wagner's decision to comply first and litigate 
later.62 
4. Provisions for Reimbursement 
SARA63 added section 106(b)(2), authorizing a simpler and 
more specific mechanism for a PRP to petition the EPA for 
reimbursement of costs of completed cleanup.64 Under SARA, 
a PRP must show by a preponderance of the evidence that it is 
not liable for those costs.65 Otherwise, it must demonstrate on 
the administrative record that the EPA's proposed response 
was "arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law."66 This is not the only interpretation of the statute,67 
which is fact dependent, but it may be the most widely accept-
ed.ss 
It is critical to this case that until the 1986 enactment of 
SARA, the procedure for claiming against Superfund was in 
section 112.69 SARA merely provided a simpler procedure for 
the Federal Judiciary has a leading role, as do other agencies such as the Depart-
ment of Justice and the Department of Defense. CERCLA §§ 106(a), 120, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9606(a), 9620 (1988). 
60. See CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988). 
61. !d. 
62. See Wagner I, 800 F.2d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 1986). 
63. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9613 
(1988)). 
64. CERCLA § 106(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2). 
65. !d. § 106(b)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(C). 
66. !d. § 106(b)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(D). 
67. See Wagner III, 946 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams, J., dissenting). 
68. See, e.g., Mays, supra note 54, at 1927. 
69. See CERCLA § 112, 94 Stat. 2792-95, (codified as amended by SARA, §§ 
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those under section 106 administrative orders, including a civil 
action, with a lower "preponderance of the evidence" standard 
of proof.70 
B. On "the Horns of a Dilemma" "Between the Devil and the 
Deep Blue Sea"71 
Like the court's metaphors, mixed above, the litany of 
provisions relating to section 106 orders demonstrates the po-
tential difficulty for a PRP that believes itself to have a merito-
rious defense to liability. 72 Punitive damages are discretionary 
with a reviewing court, up to triple the cost to the Fund. 73 
Likewise, fines up to $25,000 per day of willful violation give a 
PRP pause.74 Thus, if the EPA orders an improper remedial 
action, a PRP comes face to face with debilitating penalties and 
treble damages. These costs accrue from the deadline for com-
pliance, specified in the order, until after judicial review of the 
order and the PRP's defenses, years later. 
C. Making A Good Faith Argument For 
the "Good Faith Defense" 
One key to a PRP's "compliance decision" under an order is 
the "sufficient cause" language of the penalty provisions.75 The 
meaning of "sufficient cause," according to Senator Robert 
Stafford, sponsor of the legislation, should 
encompass defenses ... that the person who was the subject 
of the order was not the party responsible under the act for 
the release of the hazardous substance. It would certainly be 
unfair to assess punitive damages against a party who for 
good reason believed himself not to be the responsible party. 
For example, if there were, at the time of the order, substan-
tial facts in question, or if the party subject to the order was 
not a substantial contributor to the release or threatened 
release, punitive damages should either not be assessed or 
should be reduced in the interest of equity. 
l09(a)(3), 112, 100 Stat. 1633, 1646-47, at 42 U.S.C. § 9612 (1988)) (laying out a 
reimbursement claims procedure). 
70. Id. § 106 (b)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(C) 
71. Wagner I, 800 F.2d 311, 312 (2d Cir. 1986). 
72. See CERCLA § 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (1988). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. § 106(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1). 
75. Id.; § 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(b)(1), 9607(c)(3). 
401] WAGNER SEED 411 
We also intend that the [EPA's] orders ... must have been 
valid. In particular, ... not be inconsistent with the national 
contingency plan. [We] expect the courts to examine ... or-
ders or expenditures ... given the standards of the act and of 
the national contingency plan. If the orders or expenditures 
were not proper, then certainly no punitive damages should 
be assessed or they should be proportionate to the demands of 
equity.76 
Several defenses that might be "sufficient cause" are treat-
ed in the literature and cases, but are not pertinent here.77 
Invalidity of the order, on the other hand could arguably apply 
to Wagner, as it includes a failure to follow prescribed proce-
dures78 or to comply with standards set forth in the statute or 
in the National Contingency Plan.79 Moreover, the remedy 
selected by the EPA must be the most cost-effective80 and 
could be subject to attack on those grounds. 81 
D. Judicial Estoppel: Powerful, but Distinct from Equitable 
Estoppel and Collateral Estoppel 
Judicial estoppel82 is a doctrine forbidding inconsistent 
positions, usually as to facts, which operates independently of 
equitable estoppel.83 Judicial estoppel is also distinct from col-
lateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an 
issue that has been actually litigated and was essential to the 
judgment.84 Equitable estoppel precludes a change of position 
by an opposing party if one has detrimentally relied on the 
76. 126 CONG. REC. at 30986 (Nov. 24, 1980) (emphasis added). 
77. See, e.g., Randy M. Mott, Surviving the Superfund Nuclear Weapon: De-
fense of Administrative Orders, COPING WITH ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE UNDER THE NEW ADMINISTRATION: A SATELLITE PROGRAM (1989); 
Mays, supra, note 54. 
78. However, an error in remedial action selected must be so central that the 
action would have been significantly changed absent such error. See SARA § 
1130)(4); 42 U.S.C. § 96130)(4)) (1988). 
79. See 40 C.F.R. Part 300 (1991). 
80. See CERCLA § 121(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 300.68 
(1991) (National Contingency Plan). 
81. See, e.g., Colorado v. ldarado Mining Co., 707 F. Supp. 1227 (D. Colo. 
1989). 
82. 
83. 
1975). 
84. 
See Plumer, supra note 10; MOORE, supra, note 10 at «JJ 0.405[8]. 
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1178 (D. S.C. 
Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
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opposition's earlier position on which it prevailed.85 By con-
trast, in certain circumstances a party may be precluded as a 
matter of law from adopting a legal position in conflict with one 
earlier taken in the same or related litigation.86 Though not 
confined to situations where the party asserting the earlier 
contrary position prevailed there, it is considered more appro-
priate in that situation.87 
Thus, judicial estoppel operates regardless of whether the 
prior inconsistent position was successfully maintained and 
irrespective of reliance by, or prejudice to, the party invoking 
it.88 So, likewise, strangers, as well as parties to the proceed-
ing in which the prior inconsistent position was taken, may 
take advantage of the preclusion. 89 The requirement that the 
position be successfully asserted simply means that a party 
must have been successful in getting some earlier court to 
accept the position.90 
The rationale for the rule is that "it is sufficiently impor-
tant to the integrity of the federal courts that their processes 
not be lent to this plain example of 'intentional self-contradic-
tion . . . as a means of obtaining unfair advantage."'91 The 
general considerations of the orderly administration of justice 
and regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings justify the 
rule.92 Courts hold that use of inconsistent positions would 
flagrantly exemplify that playing "fast and loose with the 
courts" which has been recognized as an evil that the courts 
should not tolerate. 93 
Thus, judicial estoppel protects interests different from 
those protected by equitable estoppel.94 Equitable estoppel is 
designed to protect any adversary who may be prejudiced by 
the attempted change of position.95 On the other hand, judi-
85. Scarano v.Central New Jersey Ry., 203 F.2d 510, 512-513 (3d Cir. 1953) 
86. Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1982). 
87. ld.; see also United States v. Webber, 396 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1968). 
88. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D. S.C. 1975). 
89. ld. 
90. Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982). 
91. ld. at 1167-1168; see also Scarano v. Central New Jersey Ry., 203 F.2d 
510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953). 
92. Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(quoting 1B JEREMY C. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 'lJ .405[8) at 767 (1991)). 
93. ld. 
94. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1177 (D.S.C. 
1975). 
95. ld. 
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cial estoppel, or preclusion against inconsistent positions, is 
designed to protect the integrity of the courts and the judicial 
process.96 Its purpose is to prevent 
a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safe-
guard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot compla-
cently be tolerated consistently with the good order of soci-
ety . . . . [T]he public welfare demands that the agencies of 
public justice be not so impotent that they must always be 
mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud.97 
The effect of judicial estoppel is to bar advancement of 
truly inconsistent positions.98 A party who has obtained relief 
from an adversary by asserting and offering proof to support 
one position may not be heard later to contradict himself in an 
effort to establish against the same adversary a second claim 
inconsistent with his earlier contention.99 There is no unfair-
ness nor conflict in the rule since it is not a denial of pleading 
in the alternative. 100 Some courts have actually extended the 
rule, where identity of parties and a single transaction encom-
pass two separate actions, to bind a party making any allega-
tion to that allegation in both causes of action. 101 
The importance of judicial estoppel in the instant case is 
that the Wagner III court states that the EPA had applied its 
interpretation of the law consistently. 102 That ignores, howev-
er, the totally inconsistent approach of the EPA during Wagner 
I, where the EPA argued that PRPs had a reimbursement rem-
edy if not liable for a release which they cleaned up, and thus 
would suffer no "non-compensable harm."103 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE Wagner III COURT'S REASONING 
The Wagner III court, was deferential, arguably to the 
point of abdication. In dissent, Judge Williams pointed out that 
the EPA is not "the agency" charged with administration of 
CERCLA, so deference is misplaced, and thus the interpreta-
96. !d. 
97. !d. at 1179. 
98. Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 1984). 
99. !d. 
100. !d. at 1215; see also FED. R. Crv. P. 8(e)(2). 
101. In re Double D Dredging Co., 467 F.2d 468,469 (5th Cir. 1972). 
102. Wagner III, 946 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing 918 F.2d 1323 (7th 
Cir. 1990)). 
103. Wagner I, 800 F.2d 310, 314 (2d Cir. 1986). 
414 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 6 
tion issue should not have been so summarily dismissed. 104 
Had the court focused on interpretation, Wagner might have 
won on the merits; however, estoppel arguments should have 
precluded the EPA's interpretation entirely. 
A. The EPA Is Not Necessarily the Delegated Agency to Ad-
minister CERCLA 
Various agencies and courts are given responsibilities in 
CERCLA. Since the EPA is not the "administering agency" of 
CERCLA section 106(b)(2), it is entitled to no deference in 
interpretation.105 This fact is critical since the standard of 
review can determine the outcome here. The court cited the 
statute giving the EPA authority to pay claims to avoid suits as 
if it were sufficient to make the EPA the administering agen-
cy.106 It then cited the Chevron U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 107 rule that "when a court is 
presented with an interpretation of a statute by an agency that 
administers it, and the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, then the court must defer to that 
interpretation if it is reasonable."108 The court's entire analy-
sis hangs on this assignment. 109 
The EPA is clearly neither the delegated agency to inter-
pret nor to administer all of CERCLA.110 How much of the 
statute must the EPA administer in order to have interpretive 
omnipotence? Chevron indicates deference as to a specific sec-
104. Wagner III, at 925-926 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
105. See CERCLA § 106(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9606{b)(2) (1988). 
106. See Exec. Order No. 12480, § 4(d)(l), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. foll. § 9615; 
see also CERCLA § 106(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(A) (1988); Wagner Ill, 946 
F.2d at 920 (citing Eagle Picher-Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 909 n.9, 920 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985) as the only precedent for this proposition). 
107. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
108. Wagner III, 946 F.2d at 920. 
109. Under CERCLA § 106(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2) (1988), any "person who 
receives and complies" with an abatement order under § 106(a) may petition the 
President for reimbursement. The court identified this as the key issue. The EPA 
has been delegated the authority to settle such cases if possible, but a complain-
ant must sue the President if denied. Wagner III at 921. Here the EPA was 
interpreted to be the delegee of the President's authority, and then given such 
deference in its interpretation as arguably to nullify any appeal of that interpreta-
tion. Id. at 921-923. Had the court instead sent Wagner back to a procedure 
under § 112, the issue should have gone to arbitration, as discussed below. 
110. See United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900 F.2d 429, 434 (1st Cir. 1990) 
(refusing to give the EPA interpretation of remedies any deference); see also 
Wagner Ill 946 F.2d 918 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
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tion for which an agency is responsible.111 The EPA had au-
thority to interpret the meaning of "receives and complies" in 
section 106(b)(2) as the President's agent to pay rather than liti-
gate.112 However, under section 106(b)(l) and 106(b)(2)(B), 
the courts enforce rights of all parties, so the EPA deserves no 
deference where it merely acts as the President's "prosecu-
tor."113 
This concept is not unique. 114 Certainly in administering 
its own affairs, an agency like the EPA makes operational 
interpretations of many statutes for which it is not responsi-
ble.115 The EPA could not assay to claim that such an inter-
pretation is binding on the IRS, for example, the agency re-
sponsible for administering the tax code. One is hard pressed to 
111. See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (deference only for agency's construction 
of a statute which it administers); see also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 
638 (1990). The Court unanimously refused to defer to the Department of Labor 
on a federal private right of action under 29 U.S.C. § 1801-72 (1988). The Secre-
tary of Labor administered the act generally, and set safety standards under 29 
U.S.C. § 1841(b)(2) (1988) and made rules under § 1861, but under § 1854, the 
Court stopped. It stated that "Congress has expressly established the Judiciary 
and not the Department of Labor as the adjudicator of private rights of action 
arising under the statute," so the agency could not "bootstrap" its § 1841 authori-
ty over standards into an area in which it had "no jurisdiction." Adams Fruit, 494 
U.S. at 647. 
112. CERCLA § l06(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(A) (1988). A non-liable PRP 
can petition the President for reimbursement after it "receives and complies with 
the terms of any order." ld. 
113. In Adams Fruit, 494 U.S. 638 (1990), the Secretary of Agriculture was 
held to have no administrative oversight over § 1854 rights of action in the 
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, only power to set safety 
standards under 29 U.S.C. § 1841(b)(2). See also United States v. Western Electric 
Co., 900 F.2d 283, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (no deference to agency acting in "prosecu-
torial role"). 
114. See Wagner Ill, 946 F.2d 918 (Williams, J., dissenting); see also Adams 
Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990) (Secretary of Agriculture has no ad-
ministrative oversight over § 1854 rights); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 
900 F.2d 429, 434 (1st Cir. 1990) (refusing to give the EPA interpretation of 
remedies any deference); see, e.g. United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 
26-27 (1st Cir. 1990) (definition of "owner or operator" in CERCLA § 107(a)); 
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554-60 (11th Cir. 1990) 
("owner/operator" as well as "secured creditor exemption"); United States v. 
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168-70 (4th Cir. 1988) (affirmative defense defmition 
under § 107(b)(3) and waste generator's responsibility under § 107(a)(3)); United 
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743-44 (8th 
Cir. 1986) (individual liability under § 107(a)(3)). Even in Wagner I, a good faith 
defense against the EPA's threatened fines and penalties was reviewed de novo. 
Wagner I, 800 F.2d at 316. 
115. For example, the EPA may make operational interpretations of Title 26 of 
the U.S. Code which deals with taxation. 
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distinguish the court's actions in the instant case from such a 
situation, however. Absent language giving the EPA adminis-
trative authority, it had none over CERCLA administration in 
general. At least, the EPA had no more than the Department of 
Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE) or any agen-
cy assigned enforcement and administration of other CERCLA 
sections. 116 
B. The Court Improperly Focused on the Process 
of Section 106(b)(2), Rather Than Wagner's 
Right to a Remedy Under Section 112 
Properly viewed, Section 106(b)(2) simply provides a new 
procedural means for reimbursement from the Superfund. Con-
gress provided the original Section lll(a)(2) for any claim for 
response costs required of non-government persons and ap-
proved by the responsible federal official.117 
Section 106(b)(2) simply added an alternative procedure 
and standard of review. 118 A PRP can now sue in a civil ac-
tion in which the tribunal is a federal district court under a 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard for non-liability. 119 
Certainly, a civil action yields a more even playing field than 
an EPA administrative proceeding. 
Moreover, the EPA never asserted to the court that Wag-
ner was liable for the release in question, and no other owner 
operator existed from whom to seek contribution. 120 The least 
that the Wagner III court should have done was to send Wag-
ner back to arbitration under the old rule to seek its remedy. If 
Wagner could not fit under the new rule, the EPA could at 
least be estopped from saying that Wagner could not fit under 
the pre-existing one. 
The court claimed that the issue was not liability, but 
rather the definition of one who "receives and complies" with 
116. Courts and agencies with roles include the Federal Judiciary and the 
Department of Justice as well as the Department of Defense, CERCLA §§ 106(a), 
120, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(a), 9620 (1988). See also Executive Order No. 12580, §§ 
2(a), 2(c), 2(d), 5(a), 7(b)(2) and 4(d)(1) (Jan. 25, 1987) (delegating authority to the 
Public Health Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of 
Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Transportation, and Coast Guard). 
117. See CERCLA §§ 111(a)(2), 112(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 961l(a)(2), 9612(b); c{.id. § 
106(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2). 
118. See id. § 112(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a)-(b). 
119. Id.; § 106(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2). 
120. Wagner I, BOO F.2d 310, 312 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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an the EPA order. 121 With this little semantic twist, the court 
completely sidestepped the real issue of whether Wagner was 
entitled to a remedy. If Wagner was not liable for cleanup, then 
Wagner had paid $2.3 million for which it was not liable, and 
any liable party, or EPA which ordered the cleanup, owed resti-
tution to Wagner, a "remedy" to return Wagner to its "rightful 
position."122 Section 112 and section 106, as discussed, each 
provided a remedy to Wagner, each in its own procedural way. 
The court was arguing the interpretation of semantic nu-
ances as used to define procedures and forgot to do equity for 
those who do equity. Wagner, a non-liable PRP, funded an erro-
neous order and was entitled to a remedy. This court should 
have asked whether Wagner was entitled to a remedy, and 
whether the court was empowered to grant the remedy. The 
court almost acknowledged the real issue when it stated that 
"[i]t is fortuitous that this question arises as a potential bar to 
recovery by Wagner and, apparently, a few other parties whose 
notice and compliance straddled enactment of SARA."123 It 
defaulted in its role as a court of equity, merely waving the 
wand of "precedent" (of which there was sufficient contrary on 
these facts124) as it mouthed the "due deference" incantations, 
arriving at an unjust result. 
C. The Cursory Treatment of EPA's Conflict of Interest Defeat-
ed The "Due Process" Relied Upon in Wagner I 
The court mentioned that the EPA may have erred in issu-
ing its original order, and might not want to admit it. 125 The 
court said that this was "surely too slight a gain, however, for 
the court to consider the agency an interested party whose 
interpretation is therefore not to be accorded the deference 
ordinarily due to the agency with responsibility for administer-
ing the law."126 The court thus dismissed $2.3 million in liabil-
ity, which would certainly be a faux pas of some significance, 
even on a Superfund scale. It would be pure conjecture to esti-
mate how large a claim is required before the EPA becomes a 
121. Wagner Ill, 946 F.2d at 920. 
122. See Wagner I, 800 F.2d at 316-17; see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN 
AMERICAN REMEDIES 14 et. seq. (1985). 
123. Wagner Ill, 946 F.2d at 922. 
124. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
125. Wagner Ill, 946 F.2d at 922. 
126. Id. 
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party interested in the outcome. However, is it not likewise 
conjecture for the court to say that a $2.3 million error, and the 
loss of a section 106 liability suit, to a good faith PRP ad-
vancing an "act of God" defense was insufficient to bias the 
EPA in administering justice? 
D. Judicial Estoppel Should Have Precluded the EPA's Asser-
tion in Wagner III that Wagner Had No Remedy 
The court stated that "when a statute, viewed in light of its 
legislative history and the traditional tools of statutory con-
struction, is ambiguous, then the administering agency is enti-
tled to make reasonable policy choices in deciding how to inter-
pret it,"127 so Wagner had no right to trial de novo on issues 
of law.128 The EPA's decision against reimbursement of Wag-
ner was characterized as a non-retrospective construction of the 
law/29 with the crux of the dispute being whether Congress 
intended the term "receives" to apply retrospectively or pro-
spectively from the date the statute was adopted. 130 It reject-
ed the EPA's claim of "ownership of the plain meaning of the 
language."131 No criticism is due that part of the decision. How-
ever, the court still erred by citing Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. 
Bush, 132 to show the EPA's interpretation to be consistent. 
By invoking either the "equitable" or ')udicial" estoppel 
theory, one can argue that the EPA had already made an inter-
pretation of the availability of a remedy. In Wagner I its po-
sition was that Wagner would suffer no "non-compensable 
harm," that Wagner could have judicial review of its claim to 
reimbursement after compliance and not before.133 It knew 
that Wagner was using the "act of God" defense and never 
found Wagner liable for the cleanup costs.134 To say later that 
the reimbursement remedy was not available, was contrary to 
the interpretation of the statute on which the court relied. 135 
The EPA and the courts were ignoring the section 112 provi-
127. !d. at 920 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). 
128. !d. at 920-921. 
129. !d. at 922-933. 
130. !d. at 919-920. 
131. Id. at 924. 
132. 918 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1990). 
133. Wagner I, 800 F.2d 310, 314 (2d Cir. 1986). 
134. See id. at 312. 
135. !d. at 316-317. 
401] WAGNER SEED 419 
sions for remedy under a slightly different procedure. Even if 
one is willing to give the EPA credit for a supportable construc-
tion of the statute in Wagner III, the EPA contradicts the inter-
pretation it advanced in Wagner I. The error is particularly 
egregious when one considers that in Wagner III, the EPA 
argued that section 112 remedies were only applicable if a PRP 
had "permission" in advance to do a cleanup. 136 What is an 
"administrative order" if not permission? Even equitable estop-
pel would have applied since Wagner relied to its detriment on 
the prevailing EPA argument in Wagner I. Wagner decided to 
clean up first and apply for reimbursement later. Under judi-
cial estoppel, the mere advancement by the EPA of the argu-
ment in Wagner I (that post hoc judicial review of a claim for 
reimbursement was Wagner's remedy) was sufficient to estop 
the EPA from advancing its position Wagner III of the non-
availability of the reimbursement remedy. 137 Wagner should 
have raised this defense, and further, the court should have 
raised it sua sponte since the doctrine exists to protect the 
integrity of the judicial process.138 
D. The EPA Policy in Wagner III May 
Promote PRP Foot-Dragging 
Wagner chose to cooperate, probably to better contain the 
cost of cleanup and as a hedge against their "good faith" de-
fense to the EPA's penalties. Mter litigation, Wagner was 
worse off than if it had waited until the EPA brought an action 
to compel, and then defended against the action. Assessing the 
cost of a gamble is difficult with penalties as steep as those 
threatened in Wagner I/39 but how could Wagner possibly 
have been worse off? Litigants similarly situated, not necessari-
ly on section 106 orders like Bethlehem140 and Wagner 
II/,141 but under similar EPA postures, might use Wagner III 
as a precedent to argue that they are resisting "in good faith," 
136. See Wagner III, 946 F.2d 918, (D.C. Cir. 1991) (the EPA read § 1ll(a)(2) 
as requiring advance authorization, but then argued that their order was not an 
authorization). 
137. See id. at 921. 
138. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1177 (D. S.C. 
1975). 
139. Wagner I, BOO F.2d at 313 (2d Cir. 1986). 
140. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bush, 918 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1990) 
141. Wagner Ill, 946 F.2d 918; Wagner II, 709 F. Supp. 249; Wagner I, 800 
F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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unable to rely on the assertions of the EPA as to remedies and 
future actions. Wagner III stands for recalcitrance rather than 
cooperation; reliance on the EPA assurances of "no non-com-
pensable harm" results in "no compensation" for having cooper-
ated too readily. 
E. Summary 
In summary, the EPA is not the "administering agency" of 
CERCLA. It is a "prosecutor" entitled to no deference for pur-
poses of interpreting section 106(b)(2). It is an agent to screen 
claims and payments under section 106(a). Because of Wagner's 
poor pleading and the EPA's improper arguments, the court 
failed to focus on whether a remedy existed, and whether the 
court could provide it. The court focused instead on the ambigu-
ous wording of the section 106(b)(2) reimbursement process. 
With "undue deference"142 to the EPA's inconsistent interpre-
tations, it gave Wagner no remedy even under section 112. By 
failing to judicially estop the EPA, the court fell victim to its 
own shallow review of the facts in an odyssey between "the 
devil and the deep blue sea." Perhaps the EPA will wonder why 
PRPs are reluctant to cooperate with and rely upon it. 
V. RECOMMENDATION 
The courts still can, and should, look to their ability to do 
equity, not abdicating to agencies with incantations of "due 
deference" absent "due process." Even with complexity and 
ambiguities in statutes, they should not follow precedent from 
sister jurisdictions without analyzing for themselves what can 
be done in equity. Detailed analyses, like that of Judge 
Breyer/43 are available, so a court need not lose sight of equi-
ty, and consider itself bound, when it is not. Courts have a 
duty to "rein in" the EPA actions which over-reach to accom-
plish Congressional objectives. "Deference" should not get such 
high billing that courts stretch until any "process," regardless 
of how burdensome and inequitable, is "due process." 
PRPs should not sit idly by, bemoaning this state of affairs 
in the federal judiciary. They might avoid the Wagner trap by 
initiating remedial actions first and reasonably, to meet the 
142. See Wagner Ill, 946 F.2d at 923, 925; cf id. at 925-927 (Williams, J., 
dissenting). 
143. See United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990). 
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objectives of the law. If the EPA then goes too far, they can 
safely "wait it out," forcing the EPA to bring an action first. 
This gives the PRP access to judicial review. PRPs must docu-
ment their own good-faith actions in the administrative record 
to secure the good faith exception if the EPA becomes intransi-
gent. 
Moreover, no PRP should wait for the court to fashion a 
remedy in equity. It can find the substantive flaws in precedent 
which may be subject to attack as overly deferential, illogical, 
or not squarely on point with facts. This is hard, but Judge 
Breyer and Judge Williams looked beyond misapplied repetitive 
rhetoric, to analyze law, fact, and equity.144 
Finally, to assure that the EPA does not affront the dignity 
of the judicial process, PRPs should assert the judicial estoppel 
defense. This defense might be successfully used to keep the 
EPA from "playing fast and loose" with the courts, "arguing out 
of both sides of its mouth" as to the operative facts. Even where 
courts are less receptive to judicial estoppel, equitable estoppel 
is still recognized and an excellent alternative where a PRP 
has acted in reliance on an EPA position. 
The EPA likewise is not without a duty to deal equitably. 
No industrial corporation would commit the public relations 
"faux pas" that the EPA made, arguing first that Wagner had a 
remedy, and then later that no, that remedy was not available. 
If it wants more than "malicious obedience," the EPA must be a 
regulatory agency which develops predictable policies followed 
by cooperative industries who seek advice, and take it in good 
faith. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Wagner Seed Company's warehouse was destroyed by fire 
from a lightning strike, an "act of God" under the CERCLA 
statute, and a complete defense to liability for the subsequent 
chemical spill. Wagner received an administrative order from 
the EPA to clean up the site at its own expense or face Draco-
nian penalties. Wagner I held that pre-enforcement judicial 
review on the merits of the administrative order was not avail-
144. See Wagner III, 946 F.2d at 926, 929-930 (Williams, J., dissenting) (EPA 
not entitled to "arbitrary and capricious" standard when acting as President's 
prosecutor); Ottati & Goss, at 434, 435-436 (EPA not entitled to deference in its 
choice of remedy, and SARA does not divest equity jurisdiction from courts in 
favor of EPA). 
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able. Wagner had to comply first and seek post-cleanup reim-
bursement, subject to judicial review, if it proved to be not 
liable. Otherwise Wagner had to risk its existence, due to accu-
mulated penalties over years of non-compliance, on the chance 
that a court would find that it relied on the rarely granted "act 
of God" defense "in good faith." Unfortunately, Wagner peti-
tioned under the new section 106(b)(2) reimbursement provi-
sion rather than under section 112. It found that its defense 
was not disputed by the EPA, but the EPA interpreted section 
106(b)(2) as not allowing reimbursement to Wagner. Ironically, 
it was Wagner's early compliance on which the EPA based its 
disqualification of Wagner for the remedy. The interpretation of 
"non-availability" of reimbursement was directly contrary to 
the EPA's position adopted by the court in Wagner I. 
The court which last reviewed this case, in Wagner III, 
erred in four ways. First, the court erred by designating the 
EPA as the "administrating agency" for CERCLA with no sup-
porting language in the statute. Second, the court focused on 
the procedure of section 106(b)(2) instead of on the issue of 
whether a remedy was available at all, such as under section 
112. Third, the court gave undue deference to the EPA's inter-
pretation of the statute. Fourth, the court failed to estop the 
EPA, judicially or equitably, from changing its position on the 
availability of reimbursement. The court probably let its equita-
ble processes be abused. The analysis of the court was lengthy 
but deferred excessively to the EPA. The ruling robbed Wagner 
of the "due process" which the Wagner I court and the EPA had 
assured Wagner it could have after compliance. This inequita-
ble result, produced by the EPA's playing "fast and loose" with 
the courts, seems to say that any process at all, no matter how 
late and regardless of equity is somehow "due process." Such a 
travesty is probably a tragedy for all. 
Jack Pate 
